The use of asymmetric warfare against Israel and its impact on the strategic revision of the national security doctrine
Abstract
Understanding a military campaign and the degreeto which military strategists manage to materialize the link between the tactical use of forces and strategic objectives, under the parameters of the operational art, the operations Fair Reward and Cast Lead will be analized, undertaken by the Forces lsraeli Defense Forces (IDF) to confront Hezbollah in southern Lebanon; And Hamas, in the Gaza Strip, in 2006 and 2009, respectively. The importance of these operations, much more related to the lessons learned at the tactical level, gained greater visibility by demonstrating to those who made political decisions the urgency of updating the lsraeli national security doctrine which, in 19731 was framed in a logic of Conventional War, with serious limitations to cover actions that could face an asymmetric threat. In light of these events, the national security doctrine of 2010 was born to frame ali those determinations that validate the operational framework of the Armed Forces, in order to ad van ce towards the consolidation of its strategic objectives, both inside and outside the operations field.
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